F2 · Embedded & Security
Signed FIT U-Boot Secure Boot on Cortex-A
Overview
On a QEMU Arm `virt` machine or a TI AM62L EVM, this guide builds Zephyr and U-Boot and packages the Zephyr binary into a FIT image signed with SHA-256/RSA-2048. The workflow embeds the trusted public key into the U-Boot control device tree and uses wrong-key and tampered-image tests to validate that the boot command rejects payloads failing the signature check. This flow chains FIT, U-Boot, device tree and Zephyr into a payload-verification baseline for Cortex-A developers moving from virtual platform to physical board.
Scope of verification
- It is a signed-FIT reference workflow on a QEMU Cortex-A53 or TI AM62L EVM, validating U-Boot's signature acceptance and rejection paths for the Zephyr payload.
- Dependencies include QEMU Arm `virt` or the AM62L EVM, Zephyr/U-Boot source, a cross toolchain, OpenSSL key material, FIT/device-tree configuration and matching boot media and board setup.
- The flow only covers U-Boot verifying the Zephyr payload; QEMU has no boot-ROM/eFuse root of trust and the AM62L remains in HS-FS development state. Production deployment still needs earlier-stage signing, private-key protection, console/environment lockdown, vendor key provisioning and HS-SE lifecycle transition.
Canonical source: https://learn.arm.com/learning-paths/embedded-and-microcontrollers/zephyr-signed-fit-uboot-cortex-a/
This page is a guided summary with boundary notes, not an official reproduction.
This page is a guided summary with boundary notes, not an official reproduction.